I wonder if this could motivate others to try making even simpler implementations of TLS - essentially, an effort toward the bare minimum necessary to be secure.
The fact that they are focusing on the TLS protocol itself and not the actual encryption implementation is a good way to start; the "extraneous complexity" is not really in algorithms like RSA/ECDSA/AES since those are specified mathematically, but in the handling of the protocol messages and states. That is also where most of the bugs tend to be.
It reminds me of this Hoare quote: "There are two ways of constructing a software design: One way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies."
The fact that they are focusing on the TLS protocol itself and not the actual encryption implementation is a good way to start; the "extraneous complexity" is not really in algorithms like RSA/ECDSA/AES since those are specified mathematically, but in the handling of the protocol messages and states. That is also where most of the bugs tend to be.
It reminds me of this Hoare quote: "There are two ways of constructing a software design: One way is to make it so simple that there are obviously no deficiencies and the other way is to make it so complicated that there are no obvious deficiencies."